Th is article proposes a new method for assessing and evaluating the function and value of Ḥ adīth literature in Islamic thought, especially in relation to ʾusūlu-l-fi qh sciences. It argues that the classical Islamic scholarships embodied either by methodologies developed by the Muḥ adīthūn with the primary focus on isnād-and rijāl-based Ḥ adīth analysis or the epistemological evaluation of Ḥ adīth in the hands of the ʾUsūliyyūn is inadequate in developing a systematic methodology that would be able to ultimately resolve the current impasse on the questions of Sunnah compliance of otherwise vast (Sunni and Shiʾa) Ḥ adīth bodies of knowledge. Instead, it argues that the ultimate assessment, evaluation and defi nitive 'value' or signifi cance of Ḥ adīth literature, especially in the areas of law theory, jurisprudence but also theology, rests upon the broader questions concerning issues pertaining to what the author refers to as Qurʾāno-Sunnahic hermeneutics. Th e article draws upon a published article on the new methodology of the nature and the scope of the concept of Sunnah developed by the same author elsewhere in which a direct hermeneutic relationship between Ḥ adīth and the symbiotic nature of the Qurʾāno-Sunnahic hermeneutic relationship is established in order to argue that the questions of Ḥ adīth authenticity and reliability take a secondary role in their overall assessment and evaluation, especially in ʾusūlu-l-fi qh theory. Instead (hermeneutic or exegetical) Ḥ adīth value, signifi cance and role is primarily determined in relation to its position with regards to the delineating features and the epistemological and methodological assumptions of a particular Qurʾāno-Sunnahic hermeneutic model.
nature and the scope of the concept of Sunnah is necessary. Th is is so because, in both classical and contemporary Islamic scholarship, the Ḥ adīth body of knowledge is largely considered to be its only modus of transmission or perpetuation. Additionally, as it will be argued below, the conceptual confl ation of the nature and the scope of the concept of Sunnah 1 with that of "authentic" Ḥ adīth as defi ned by ʿulūmu-l-ḥ adīth sciences has important implications in how its function, value and significance in the overall Islamic thought came to be determined. According to the classical Islamic scholarship as defi ned by the Muḥ adīthūn 2 the concept of Sunnah in terms of its authenticity 3 is defi ned as comprising of numerous narratives or Ḥ adīth documenting Prophet Muhammad's deeds (fi ʾl ), utterances (qawl ), and spoken approval 4 (taqrīr) as embodied in various Ḥ adīth compendia considered as "authentic" according to the standards and criteria applied by the classical sciences of Ḥ adīth criticism (ʿulūmu-l-ḥ adīth).
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Th e implications of this defi nition of the concept of Sunnah, which we here term Ḥ adīth-dependent Sunnah, are several. Firstly, it assumes that the epistemological scope of Sunnah is epistemologically dependent upon and constrained by Ḥ adīth, i.e. that its epistemological value is the same as that of each "authentic" Ḥ adīth and that Ḥ adīth is the sole depository and the sole vehicle of Sunnahic perpetuation. Secondly, it assumes that Sunnah is methodologically dependent upon Ḥ adīth. By methodologically dependent on Ḥ adīth it is meant that the Sunnah compliance (or otherwise) of certain (legal or theological) practices or principles, is and can only be determined by sifting through numerous narratives reportedly going back to Prophet Muhammad via an authentic chain of narrators (isnād ). Th irdly, as a corollary to the second premise, coalescing and substituting
1 Th e precise meaning of this phrase is given in the main text below. 2 Experts on the transmission of Ḥ adīth, their compilation, classifi cation and authenticity/ criticism.
3 A sound Ḥ adīth and therefore Sunnah, in its "post-Shafi ʾi" form (see our discussion in the main text below) consisted of a matn (text) and chain of transmitters (isnād ), usually but not always going back to the Prophet. 4 the nature and the scope of the concept of Sunnah with that of Ḥ adīth breaks the symbiotic and organic relationship between the concept of Qurʾān and Sunnah as it existed during the fi rst four generations of Muslim 6 making the Qurʾān increasingly more hermeneutically dependent upon the Ḥ adīth compendia. Fourthly, as result of the above, Sunnah's organic and symbiotic relationship with the Qurʾān, termed by Graham the "Prophetic-Revelatory event", was severed and Qurʾān's hermeneutic dependence upon Ḥ adīth body of knowledge entrenched. Fifthly, Sunnah's nature, function and purpose, rather than being conceptualised primarily in ethico-religious terms became increasingly legalistic. 
Ḥ adīth Assessment and Evaluation in Classical Islamic Th ought
Th e assessment and evaluation of a particular Ḥ adīth in relation to the normative fountainheads of the Islamic Worldview, namely Qurʾān and Sunnah, according to both classical and contemporary Islamic scholarship, has been approached via three avenues. One method was developed by the specialists in Ḥ adīth's authenticity/criticism, transmission, compilation and classifi cation, namely the Muḥ adīthūn, have predominantly focused on assessing Ḥ adīth authenticity and reliability by probing their isnād (chain of transmission) which, in essence, largely amounts to concerning themselves with the reliability of the rijāl (lit. men) that are responsible for its transition. 8 To a lesser extent they also examined Ḥ adīth's body of text or matn.
9 Based on this approach Ḥ adīth's overall authenticity/reliability was evaluated and their subsequent classifi cation ranging from authentic to unreliable was developed. Th e main problem with this approach is not only the paucity of material from the fi rst century of Islamic thought that fuels the ongoing debates among Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike on the historical authenticity of the isnād as a means of establishing Ḥ adīth authenticity 10 but also the subjective nature of the criteria used in Ḥ adīth Another approach to evaluating Ḥ adīth was from a purely epistemological vantage point. Th is practice was adopted by Islamic legal scholars (ʾUsūliyyūn) as part of their overall approach to Islamic Law as, to borrow Zysow terminology, "the economy of certainty". 13 Th is method focused fi rst and foremost on developing criteria relating to the quantitative transmission of knowledge based on probability. Questions such as at what point in time and at what evidentiary level would human faculty of reason 'accept' transmitted knowledge as either inducing certainty ( yaqin), thus yielding immediate knowledge (daruri) or amounting to less then that (zann/probable and acquired knowledge) were decisive.
14 Classifi cation of Ḥ adīth according to this technique ranged from isolated (ahad ) Ḥ adīth that yielded zann knowledge only to that of mutawatir or successive Ḥ adīth that, according to the majority of ʾUsūliyyūn, reached daruri knowledge.
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Th e problem with this method in relation to Sunnah is that only very few Ḥ adīth, not amounting to more then a dozen 16 or according to some none 17 can be considered to have fulfi lled the criteria of mutawatir level of transmission.
Another approach to evaluation of Ḥ adīth developed by the ʾUsūliyyūn relates more closely to Islamic legal methodology or ʾusūlu-l-fi qh. Professor M.H. Kamali defi nes ʾusūlu-l-fi qh as a science "concerned with the sources of [Islamic] law, their order of priority, and methods by which legal rules 11 E.g., evaluating the nature of the character of a person or his memory diff ered from one scholar to another, aff ecting the level of authenticity of the Ḥ adīth in question. 12 may be deduced from the source materials of Sharʾīah".
18 Ahmed off ers a more elaborate defi nition of ʾusūlu-l-fi qh as consisting of three components: (1) a theory of practical legal determinations (aḥ kām) which are considered the fruits of legal thinking; (2) the sources of the law, both textual and extra-textual; (3) principles of legal reasoning that link the sources of the law to practical legal determinations.
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For the purposes of this article, it is important to point out that the textual and extra-textual sources, methods and their priorities and the principles of legal reasoning that link the sources of the law to practical legal determinations have undergone signifi cant changes in particular during the pre-classical period before they became more or less fi xed in the later classical scholarship. Th e fi rst modifi cations relate to the conceptual and hermeneutic relationship between Qurʾān-Sunnah, Sunnah-Ḥ adīth, (and therefore Qurʾān-Ḥ adīth) and that of the role of reason vis-à-vis Qurʾān, Sunnah, Ḥ adīth and the concept of the consensus of the jurist community (ijmāʿ ). As I have shown elsewhere a symbiotic hermeneutical relationship between Qurʾān and Sunnah was severed once the nature and the concept of Sunnah was epistemologically and methodologically confl ated with that of Ḥ adīth thus hermeneutically constraining the Qurʾān and its exegesis with that of the Ḥ adīth body of literature.
20 Subsequently, once a fi xed, textually based and hierarchical ʾusūlu-l-fi qh model was put in place with hermeneutically Ḥ adīth-dependent Qurʾān and Sunnah occupying the fi rst two sources followed by the principles of ijmāʿ (the consensus of scholars), the non-textual sources such as pure reason or the objectively based nature of ethical value that had considerable presence in the very conceptualization of the concepts of Qurʾān and Sunnah during the earlier stages of the formative period of Islamic thought were hermeneutically marginalized 21 or considered illegitimate. As I argued elsewhere writing about this epistemologico-methodological shift, Rahman comments that while in earlier times of the Companions the use of ijtihād slowly crystallised in consensus, giving rise to as-sunnah al-maʾrifa (well-known Sunnah), only to be again abolished and re-formulated in the light of new circumstances, the epistemological value of ijtihād was reversed in the post-Shafi ʾi period so that ijtihād was signifi cantly constrained by the ijmāʿ principle.
23 All this contributed to "the conviction becom[ing] absolute that law is justifi ed only if it can be related hermeneutically to Prophetic example, and not if it is presented discursively as emanating from an ongoing juristic tradition.
24 It also inaugurated a paradigm shift in Islamic thought, and that of ʾusūlu-l-fi qh sciences in particular, that Calder describes as a transition from a discursive tradition to a hermeneutic tradition (purporting to derive the law exegetically from the Prophetic sources).
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Moreover, during the transmission from the pre-classical to classical Islamic thought changes in the manner the notion of the nature and the scope of the Qurʾān and Sunnah were conceptualized took place. By this we mean that the concepts were understood more in ethico-moral and religious rather then legal positivist terms. For example certain actions that had no direct precedent in the 'reifi ed', textually based Qurʾān and Sunnah were considered permissible on the basis of the concept of justice or fairness, contextualizing and considering the broader implications such as the concept of the benefi t of the community or alleviating of hardship, i.e. on quasi-natural law considerations. 26 Additionally, the concept of Sunnah was not solely linked to the persona of the Prophet but included the judgments and actions of the fi rst caliphs such as Abu Bakr and ʿUmar or even that of the Muslim community (ʿamal-based Sunnah in Medina or Sunnah al-maʾrufa in Iraq). 27 
Sunnahic
29 teachings were conceptualized, interpreted or derived. For example, since pre-classical concept of Sunnah, apart from its ʿamal component, was primarily conceived in form of abstract ethico-moral and/or theological terms, was reason inclusive and was conceptualised in terms of the broader Qurʾānic objectives and purposes (maqasid ), it permitted a wider interpretational playing fi eld/framework than that based on classical defi nition of Ḥ adīth -dependent Sunnah outlined above.
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With the hermeneutic and conceptual delinking of Qurʾān and Sunnah, the development of the methodologically, epistemologically and hermeneutically dependent concept of the scope and the nature of Sunnah and the above-described hierarchy of sources of classical ʾusūlu-l-fi qh theory, the Ḥ adīth body of literature came to hermeneutically occupy centre stage. With time the Ḥ adīth-independent Sunnah formulations of the early schools of thought had to increasingly accommodate and accept this new Ḥ adīth-centred ʾusūlu-l-fi qh theory. 
New Methodology of Sunnah and the Assessment/Evaluation of Ḥ adīth Hermeneutic Value and Signifi cance
As argued above, during the pre-classical period of Islamic thought the Qurʾān and Sunnah discourse was considered to be organically intertwined or symbiotically interdependent as these two sources were conceptualized as a single, coherent hermeneutic unity. Furthermore, they were not textually fi xed and were often understood as more abstract ethico-religious concepts whose purpose was to facilitate the benefi t of the community and alleviation of hardship based on principles of ethically objective values such as maʿruf (that which is commonly good) and ʿadl (justice). Based on these considerations, I have elsewhere proposed a new methodology of Sunnah that is in agreement with this overall approach to conceptualising and interpreting Qurʾān and Sunnah. 29 A. Duderija, 'Toward a New Methodology', op. cit. 30 See ibid. 31 With some exceptions such as Al-Ghalazi's, Shatibi's and Tusi's theories which advocated a maqasid or objective or purpose-based ʾusūlu-l-fi qh theory. Th ese development, however, happened centuries after the main foundations of the classical ʾusūlu -l-fi qh theory was formulated and as such aff ected it only marginally. See A. Duderija, 'Th e Evolution ', op.cit. According to this new approach, I fi rst argued that, based on the uniformly acknowledged need of the Qurʾān to be interpreted, i.e. its Deutungsbeduerftigkeit, and the subsequent premise that Prophet's embodiment of the Qurʾānic message as one of its most authoritative (if not the most authoritative) interpreters, this interpretational vacuum was fi lled by taking recourse to the concept of Sunnah that appears in the Qurʾān in the oft repeated form of 'Obey Allah and His Messenger'. Sunnah was a wellknown pre-Qurʾānic concept existing among Arabs of the region, connoting an authoritative source of knowledge/practice or a normative example to be followed.
32 Th e usage of the term Sunnah of the Prophet (Sunnah an-Nabi) existed early on most likely at the time of the Prophet himself.
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Furthermore, I contended that the Qurʾān and Sunnah existed in a conceptually unifi ed and symbiotic hermeneutical relationship. Th us their scope and nature were considered to be the same. Put diff erently, they were considered as two sides of the same coin. By scope I mean that they accommodated extra-textual sources of knowledge to the same extent and by the term nature I mean that they concern themselves with a number of dimensions of human existence including belief, ethics, law and ritual. As such I also argued that Sunnah consisted of four elements refl ecting the nature and the elements of the Qurʾānic discourse, namely: Sunnah aqidiyyah (belief-based Sunnah), Sunnah akhlaqiyyah (ethics-based Sunnah), Sunnah fi qhiyyah (law-based Sunnah) and Sunnah ʿibadiyya/ ʿamaliyyah 34 (ritual and/or practiced-based Sunnah).
According to this approach, all of the components of Sunnah, apart from its ʿibadiyya/ ʿamaliyya dimension which is in essence in actu and requires no interpretation and which is not dependent on written transmission of knowledge but is practically perpetuated, are hermeneutically 32 Like many other key words in Islamic thought (ijtihād, raʾy, bidaʾah or ḥ adīth), the word Sunnah underwent a number of semantic changes. See Ansari, Z.I., 'Islamic Juristic Terminology before Shafi ʾi : A Semantical Analysis with Special Reference to Kufa', Arabica, xix, 1972. 33 Ibid., pp. 263-264. 34 Th e diff erence between Sunnah ʿibadiyyah and Sunnah ʿamaliyyah is that the former deals with practices relating to Islamic rituals such as salat, hajj, adhan, or circumcision whilst that of Sunnah ʿamaliyya is broader and includes the early Muslim community's embodiment of these practices as well as civil/communal transactions considered to be in accordance with the spirit and the essence of the Prophet's Sunnah. For more on this dimension of ʿamal, see Dutton, Yasin. Th e Origins of Islamic Law-Th e Qurʾān, the Muwatta and Madinian ʿAmal, Routledge, Curzon, 2002. directly linked to that of the Qurʾān. Th is, in turn, implies that the Sunnah compliance or otherwise of certain principles, beliefs or actions is entirely dependent on the way Qurʾān is interpreted. Th erefore, the most crucial and decisive factor in establishing Sunnah is linked to methodologies pertaining Qurʾānic interpretation, i.e. the questions pertaining to Qurʾānic hermeneutics even if the Qurʾānic literal text itself is silent on the issue under consideration and not an automatic default deferral to Ḥ adīth body of literature as either authenticated by the Muḥ adīthūn or ʾUsūliyyūn. As such this method restores Sunnah's conceptual and hermeneutical link with the Qurʾān that was evident in the pre-classical Islamic scholarship. Importantly, this approach to Sunnah/Ḥ adīth dynamic and their role in the overall ʾusūlu-l-fi qh theory is also not constrained with the hierarchical classical ʾusūlu-l-fi qh theory described above as it dislocates and displaces the central role of Ḥ adīth body of literature which, alongside the principle of ijmāʿ, largely determines the hermeneutic playing fi eld within which Qurʾān and Sunnah could be interpreted.
New interpretational possibilities of Qurʾān and Sunnah could be developed by putting in place new Qurʾānic hermeneutic models that, for example, give more scope to non-textual sources such as reason or which are based on objective-based nature of ethical value or which permit a more contextual-based approaches to Qurʾāno-Sunnahic interpretation or which are based on the notion of giving hermeneutic primacy to ethicomoral or objective-based (maqasid ) approaches to ʾusūlu-l-fi qh theory. In the second section it was argued that isnad-and rijāl-based approach to evaluation of Ḥ adīth authenticity and reliability as espoused by Muḥ adīthūn as well as the epistemological evaluation of Ḥ adīth by the ʾUsūliyyūn do not systematically and suffi ciently well solve the conundrums associated with the Deutuhngsbedueftigkeit of the Qurʾān and the nature of the Sunnah-Ḥ adīth (and for that matter Sunnah-Qurʾān and Qurʾān-Ḥ adīth) hermeneutic relationship due to the inherent methodological weaknesses in the underlying premises governing these approaches. Indeed, throughout the entire history of the Islamic thought there have been cases of propounding contradictory or even mutually exclusive views based on unsystematic use of Ḥ adīth (and Qurʾānic verses/ayāt) all claiming to be in accordance with the Qurʾān and Sunnah or the accusation of the Muslim "Other" of not following the "true" Qurʾān and Sunnah teachings, especially among the more literally oriented communities of interpretation as, for example, espoused by ʾAhl-ḥ adīth or to lesser extern Hanbali school of thought.
36
Based on the newly proposed methodology outlined in the third section, it becomes clear that the function and the signifi cance of Ḥ adīth body of literature in Islamic thought, and in ʾusūlu-l-fi qh disciplines in particular, needs to be established on new criteria that: a. acknowledge the hermeneutically symbiotic and inter-dependent relationship between Qurʾān and Sunnah that existed during the early formative period of Islamic thought; b. take into account the conceptually and hermeneutically independent relationship between Sunnah and Ḥ adīth and by implication that of Qurʾān and Sunnah that was evident during the early formative period of Islamic thought; c. recognize that the classical formulation of ʾusūlu-l-fi qh theory did not make the above distinction engendering a largely Ḥ adīth-centered d. acknowledge that in the fi nal analysis, contemporary debates on the assessment and evaluation of the function and the signifi cance of Ḥ adīth body of knowledge in Islamic thought are not to remain solely within the theoretico-epistemological framework of the classical ʿulūmu-l-ḥ adīth sciences under the purview of the classically trained Muḥ adīthūn (or the western Muslim and non-Muslim scholars operating within the same) but that these scholarly discourses need to be closely linked to the questions relating to the development of Qurʾānic (or more precisely Qurʾāno-Sunnahic) hermeneutic models, i.e. ʾusūlu-l-fi qh sciences. In this context the most fruitful assessment and evaluation of the value and the signifi cance of each Ḥ adīth will not solely be conceptualized a priori in terms of its authenticity/reliability or its epistemological value but how its message/text fi ts into an overall broader hierarchically structured Qurʾāno-Sunnahic hermeneutic model. So the crucial question or questions, in this context, is/are not just whether or not a particular Ḥ adīth has an impeccable isnad or if is it a mutawatir Ḥ adīth, but what are the delineating features and underlying methodological and epistemological assumptions governing the interpretational processes of a certain scholar pertaining to conceptualization and interpretation of the nature and the scope of the Qurʾānic and Sunnahic bodies of knowledge who uses this particular Ḥ adīth in order to argue a particular point of view and where does, according to his/her hermeneutic, Ḥ adīth fi t into it.
Conclusion
Th is article argued for a paradigm shift in which the question of the value and signifi cance (rather then just authenticity and reliability) of the Ḥ adīth body of knowledge in Islamic thought and in particular in Islamic legal theory. It was further contended that classical methods of assessing and evaluating the role of Ḥ adīth in Islamic thought and practice are unable to off er a systematic methodology that would defi ne and delineate a clear role and function of Ḥ adīth body of knowledge in relation to Islamic sciences, and particularly those pertaining to Islamic law and Islamic legal theory (but also theology/philosophy/mysticism). Based on a new methodology of conceptualizing the nature and the scope of the Qurʾān and Sunnah discourse and their hermeneutical inter-relationship vis-à-vis each other as well as that of Ḥ adīth, the author maintained that the questions pertaining to Ḥ adīth's authenticity and reliability become of secondary importance in relation to their function and signifi cance and that the questions relating to their hermeneutic position in the broader Qurʾāno-Sunnahic hermeneutic structure (that is inclusive of Ḥ adīth) and its underlying epistemological and methodological assumptions are much more important and revealing. Th us, this new methodology of assessing and evaluating the hermeneutical value and signifi cance of Ḥ adīth call for and highlights a need for a syntheses of ʿulūmu-l-ḥ adīth and ʾusūlu-l-fi qh fi elds of knowledge.
